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STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action by the plaintiff, the State Treasurer of 
Utah, a constitutional officer, against the defendants pur-
suant to the Declaratory Judgments Act (Rule 57, Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, and Chapter 33, Title 78, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953) . 
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In this proceeding, the plaintiff asks the court to de-
clare the portions of the State Money Management Act . 
Chapter 206, Laws of Utah, 1969, (Senate Bill #205), 
which affect the State Treasurer to be unconstitutional 
and additionally requests that the defendants be enjoined 
from implementing said sections of the act. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The trial court in a Memorandum decision (Record 
Page 73 Et. seq.) held that the State Money Management 
Act, Chapter 206, Laws of Utah, 1969 (Senate Bill 205) 
was constitutional and ordered that the plaintiff's com-
plaint be dismissed with prejudice on the merits. 
From this decision, the plaintiff has appealed. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant seeks reversal of the judgment of the 
lower court and asks the Supreme Court to determine that 
the State Money Management Act, Chapter 206, Laws of 
Utah, 1969 (Senate Bill 205) is unconstitutional in whole 
or in part, i.e., the portions thereof specifically and referred 
tJ in the Complaint of the plaintiff (Record p. 1-6). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiff is the State Treasurer of Utah. He is a 
constitutional officer created under the provisions of Article 
VII, Section One of the Constitution of Utah and com-
prises a part of the executive department which consists of 
the Governor, the Secretary of State, State Auditor, State 
Treasurer and Attorney General. 
The State Treasurer is an elective officer required to 
perform "such duties as are prescribed by this constitution 
and as may be prescribed by law." 
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Section Seventeen of Article VII of the Constitution 
provides that "The Treasurer shall be the custodian of 
public monies," and then additionally provides that he 
shall "perform such other duties as may be provided by 
Jaw." 
Those additional duties are described to a large extent 
in Chapter 4 of Title 67, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
Under the provisions of various State statutes the 
' plaintiff, as State Treasurer, and his predecessor State 
Treasurer's have made deposits of public funds in qualified 
depositories designated by the State Depository Board 
(Chapter 1 of Title 51, Utah Code Annotated, 1953). Pur-
suant to that act, the State Treasurer determines the 
amount of deposits that may be made in any one deposi-
tory and the amount of available cash necessary to take 
care of immediate cash flow needs. 
In pursuance of the provisions of Sections 33-1-4 and 
33-1-4.1 relating to the investment of public funds, the 
State Treasurer has determined what constitutes idle funds 
or funds not necessary for the immediate needs of any of 
the departments whose funds are in his hands and has 
determined the types of obligations of the United States in 
which investment would be made. The State Treasurer 
again determined "the cash flow needs" of the State and 
its respective departments in order to determine the maturi-
ties of the obligations of the United States which were pur-
chased subject to the limitation that he not purchase any 
item having a maturity of more than five years from date 
of purchase. Similarly, under the provisions of Section 
33-1-4.1, management of investments was in the hands of 
the State Treasurer with respect to bonds of the United 
States and of any municipalities, school district or water 
conservancy district permitted to be handled under that 
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section. Accordingly, the State Treasurer was required to 
establish methods, practices and procedures for investment 
' reinvestment, purchase, sale or exchange transactions re-
garding public funds and has been required to determine 
the extent to which a portion of the public funds should 
remain available for current expenditures. 
Historically, the State Treasurer during the days that 
Utah was a territory and thereafter has received all money 
or property belonging to the territory or the State and 
apparently dealt with that money in such manner as would 
give assurance that it would be available for the expedi-
tures of the State (Territorial Laws of Utah, 1851-70). 
At Chapter 38, page 35, Laws of 1852, Sections 3 and 4 
of the Territorial Laws provided as follows: 
SECTION 3. 
"The treasurer shall receive all monies or other 
property belonging to the territory that may be 
raised by taxation or otherwise; and shall procure 
suitable books in which it shall enter an account of 
his receipts and disbursements, to whom and on 
what account." 
SECTION 4. 
"The treasurer shall pay all money that may come 
into his hands, by virtue of his office, upon drafts 
and orders countersigned by the auditor of public 
accounts; and shall annually report to the governor 
on or before the first day of November, or often-
or .... " 
The compiled Laws of Utah, 1876, Title IV, Sections 46 
and 47 contain substantially the same language as above 
quoted with reference to Sections 3 and 4 of Chapter 38, 
Laws of Utah, 1852. 
In the compiled Laws of Utah, 1876, provision was 
made in Title 12, Section 2068, which established a list of 
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crimes by officers of that State including the State Treas-
urer which involved revenue and property of the State. 
Subparagraph 3 of Section 2068 made it a crime if "he fails 
to keep same in his possession until disbursed. or paid out 
by authority of law." Subparagraph 4 provided that it was 
a crime if he "unlawfully deposits the same or any portion 
thereof in any book or with any banker or other person." 
The compiled. Laws of Utah, 1888, contained. similar 
provisions as those referred to above at Section 4603. 
The Money Management Act, among other things, 
creates a division of investments in the Office of the State 
Treasurer. (Section 4, Chapter 206, Laws of Utah, 1969.) 
It creates an Investment Council within the division of in-
vestments and provides that the Investment Council shall 
be comprised of the State Treasurer, the Commissioner of 
Financial Institutions and three other members appointed. 
by the Governor with the advice and consent of the State 
Treasurer and the Senate. (Section 5, Chapter 206, Laws 
of Utah, 1969) 
The Act impowers the Investment Council to establish 
the p:::>licies of the division of investments, to advise counsel 
and direct the Investment officer and the financial ana-
lyst to adopt and promulgate rules and regulations pertain-
ing to the investment of public funds and in general to per-
form a series of other functions relating to the administ-
ration of public funds and the qualification and control of 
depositories. 
The Act at Section 9, provides, among other things, 
for the employment of a "Chief Administrative Officer of 
the Division of Investments and a Deputy Administrative 
Officer of the Division to be known as the Financial Ana-
lyst." 
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The Investment Officer and the Financial Analyst 
"shall be appointed by the State Treasurer with the ap. 
proval of at least four members of the Investment Council 
' and their respective salaries shall be fixed by the Council 
in consultation with the Director of Finance and approved 
by the Board of Examiners." 
Moreover, Section 9 provides that the Investment Of-
ficer and the Financial Analyst shall serve at the will of 
the Investment Council. 
Section 11 of the Act describes the duties of the In-
vestment Officer which generally stated relate to the in-
vestment and reinvestment of public funds. 
ARGUMENT 
Point 1 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL DUTY OF THE STATE TREAS-
URER AS "CUSTODIAN OF PUBLIC MONEY" IN-
CLUDES THE POWERS OF DEPOSIT AND INVEST-
MENT DESCRIBED IN SECTIONS 7 AND 11 OF THE 
MONEY MANAGEMENT ACT. 
As a custodian of public monies it has been held that 
the State Treasurer, in the absence of express authority, 
has power to deposit public funds in the banks in accordance 
with ordinary business practice and may stipulate for and 
receive interest thereon. (59 C.J. p. 228, "States," Par. 374) 
See also C.J.S. 1191 Par. 155. 
See also U. S. Fidelity Company, etc. v. Taylor 
Guarantee, 200 F, 44., State v. McFetridge, 54 N.W. 
1 (84 Wis. 473). 
In practice, the State Treasurer has in fact made de-
posits of funds into banks of his choosing subject to deter-
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mination as to qualification of depositories by the State 
Depository Board (See Statutory Citation in Statement of 
Facts) and subject to determinations as to the required 
interest rate that must be paid by qualified depositories 
established by the State Depository Board. 
In practice, too, the State Legislature has recognized 
the duty of the treasurer so to do but has provided limit-
ations and controls over the qualifications of the depositor-
ies, the amount of interest they may pay and has imposed 
limits as to the amount that may be placed in the custody 
of any one depository. (Section 51-4-1, Et. seq., Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953), but determinations as to the amount of 
the deposits placed in any one bank has been recognized in 
practice as the duty of the State Treasurer. 
The practice followed over many years may determine 
the scope of the constitutional functions of the State Treas-
urer or of any other constitutional officer. This was re-
cognized by the Utah Supreme Court in Tite v. State Tax 
Commission, 57 P. 2d 734 p. 738. 
So too both practice and state law has recognized the 
duty of the investment of public money within the custody 
of the State Treasurer in securities of the Federal Govern-
ment. (Section 33-1-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953). 
In practice this investment in Federal bonds has been 
followed by State Treasurers subject to approval as to 
type of investment and amount of interest by the Board of 
Loan Commissioners. 
The decision as to whether or not any of the public 
money within his custody should be invested in securities 
was made by the State Treasurer and incidental to the 
exercise of that duty the State Treasurer determined the 
maturity dates at which he would make purchases of bonds 
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after making a determination as to daily balances of cash 
needed by the various departments whose funds were in his 
control. 
Accordingly, he made determinations as to whether 
or not they should be short term or long term investments 
as contemplated by the provisions of Section 3 of the State 
Money Management Act. 
The State Treasurer accordingly asserts that the power 
to make other types of investments than those heretofore 
allowed by statute, and the duty to make said investments 
is a part of the constitutional functions of the State Treas-
urer. 
Generally speaking, the Treasurer of a state has those 
consitutional duties concerning the holding of funds of the 
state which are usually involved in the duties of a treasurer 
(Tucker, Secretary of State, et al., v.State (Indiana) 35 
N .E. Rep. 2nd, 270). To hold otherwise would place a treas-
urer in an untenable position. It is generally held that public 
officers who have charge of public funds and public money 
are charged with the duty as trustees to disperse and ex-
pend the money for the purposes and in the manner pre-
scribed by law and they are liable if they divert the trust 
funds from the governmental purposes for which they were 
collected. ( 43 Am. Jur. p. 111, Par 306, Annot, 96 ALR, 664). 
It is well established, also, that one duty of a public 
officer entrusted with public money is to keep that money 
safely and this duty he performs at his peril. 
According to the weight of authority, numeri-
cally at least, a public officer in the absence of 
statutory provisions to the contrary is held to a 
much stricter liability than the fiduciaries hand-
ling private funds. He is absolutely liable as an in-
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surer for the safekeeping of funds in his custody 
until dispersed in regular course and is therefore 
liable for losses which occur even without his fault. 
(43 Am. Jur. 113 Par. 309) (Am. Jur. cites numer-
ous cases in footnotes 5, 6 and 7, page 113 and an-
notations at 18 ALR 982; 38 ALR 1512, s 96 ALR 
295; 93 ALR 821, 155 ALR 437) 
Tooele County v. De La Mare, 90 Utah 46, 59 
P2nd, 1155. 
This strict accountability of public treasurers has even 
been applied to the functions of a public treasurer in the 
selection of depositories. 
In most jurisdictions in the absence of statutes 
to the contrary, the rule is firmly established that a 
public officer entrusted with the custody of public 
monies is personally liable for their loss through 
the failure of the bank in which he has deposited 
them, however careful and prudent he may have 
been. It makes no difference that he believes the 
bank to be sound or that it has generally been so 
regarded and that in depositing the funds he mere-
ly followed a long prevailing custom. (ALR cites 
numerous cases in footnotes 3, 4 and 5 and annot-
ation at 65 ALR for 814). 
Plaintiff affirms that the State Treasurer has by con-
stitution the custody and control of the money of the State 
and that said custody and control includes the function of 
managing, investing, reinvesting and depositing the monies 
of the State and that because his power is derived from the 
constitution, he cannot be deprived of such control by the 
legislature. In Re: House Resolution 12 Colorado 395, 21 P. 
486. Tucker, Secretary of State, et al., v. State, 35 N.E. 
Rep. 2nd, 270 (Indiana). Hudson v. Kelly (Ariz.) 263, P2nd, 
362 Thompson v. Leg. Audit. Comm. (N.M.) 448 P2nd 799, 
Wright v. Callahan (Idaho) 99 P2nd, 961. 
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Contrary to the conclusion reached by the District 
Court in its Memorandum decision, the plaintiff does not 
assert that the Legislature has no power to legislate direc-
tives to the State Treasurer with reference to the manner 
of investment and the manner in which funds of the State 
\\'ill be managed (Record p. 78). It is the assertion, how-
ever, of the State Treasurer that the State Legislature may 
not in addition to exercising said controls, designate other 
administrators to perform the functions of managing the 
money and making the investments. The framers of the 
Constitution of the State of Utah must be deemed to have 
considered the term "custody of public monies" to en-
compass something more than a mere depository; otherwise, 
why the creation of an elective office deliberately insulated 
from powers and pressures that would arise were it an ap-
pointive office_ 
Custody by an elective constitutionally created of-
ficer who is hedged around with a firm obligation to protect 
the public monies and expend them only in a manner direct-
ed by lawful means must encompass exclusive power or 
obligation to dispose or handle funds such as make deposits, 
determine the amount of a deposit, with whom the deposit 
should be made and when the money should be withdravm 
or mature. Custody must include the expenditure of the 
money, either pursuant to directives of the Legislature or 
to expend the money to purchase securities, i.e., bonds or 
stock in order to utilize idle funds. Until the Money Pur-
chase Act was enacted, the ability to invest was limited to 
bonds of various kinds. But the fact remains that custody 
was deemed to include a determination upon the part of the 
State Treasurer as to which bonds would be purchased, the 
maturities of the bonds purchased and the interest to be 
derived therefrom. These powers had to do with the ability 
to correlate the availability of money with the "cash flow 
10 
cbmrnds" of the various departments of government whose 
funds were being managed. Throughout the years, this cus-
1 ody of the State Treasurer was subjected to legislative 
c:-uidelines. The legislature limited the State Treasurer as 
to 1he types of bonds, imposed limitations as to maximum 
1)1' minimum interest. maximum maturities, the types of 
i.ssucr's, etc. Moreover, the Legislature during the past 
years, imposed the qualifications of depositiories and creat-
ed a depository board which made determinations as to the 
q;:;tlifications of the depositories but who were required to 
leave the decision as to when a deposit \vould be made and 
with whom in the hands of the State Treasurer. (Title 51, 
Chapters 4 and 5) 
It is not conceivable that "the Treasurer" is limited to 
the ministerial chores of a clerk, i.e., writing the voucher 
or check, the bookkeeping and the making of reports. It 
do:?s not seem conceivable that the State Treasurer would 
be held accountable for the safety of the funds in his care 
if he was a mere clerk and had no powers with reference 
to the management of the funds. 
If the Investment Committee and the Investment 
Director carried out the management functions of the 
money s:::'t forth in the Money Management Act, the State 
Treasurer would not be able to make the determinations 
rf'quisite to protecting the safety of the funds in his care 
:-nd custody. 
The plaintiff does not assert that the Legislature could 
1-;ot accomplish the aims desired in the Money Management 
• \ct to more economically utilize idle funds, but he asserts 
that this must be done within the framework of his con-
stitutional powers and obligations to retain custody and 
control of the money involved. 
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POINT 2 
THE CREATION BY THE LEGISLATURE OF AN IN-
VESTMENT DIVISION WITHIN THE OFFICE OF THE 
STATE TREASURER, THE CREATION OF THE IN-
VESTMENT COUNCIL AND THE CREATION OF AN 
INVESTMENT OFFICER AND FINANCIAL ANALYST 
TO ADMINISTER THE FUNCTIONS OF SAID DIVISION 
INDEPENDENTLY OR SEMI-INDEPENDENTLY OF 
THE STATE TREASURER ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
ENCROACHMENTS UPON THE POWERS AND DUTIES 
OF THE STATE TREASURER AS A CONSTITUTIONAL 
OFFICER. 
The Constitution of the State of Utah follows the pat-
tern of establishing three departments of government which 
are comprised of the Legislative, Executive and the Judi-
cial and expressly prohibits encroachment by one depart-
ment upon the functions and powers of the other. 
Article V, Section 1 of the Utah Constitution 
provides: 
"The powers of the government of the State 
of Utah shall be divided into three district depart-
ments, the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judi-
cial; and no person charged with the exercise of 
powers properly belonging to one of these depart-
ments, shall exercise any function appertaining to 
either of the others except in the cases herein ex-
pressly directed or permitted. 
Article VII then describes the composition of the Exec· 
utive Department in the following language: 
"The Executive Department shall consist of 
Governor, Secretary of State, State Auditor, State 
Treasurer and Attorney General, each of them shall 
hold his ;ff ice for four years beginning on the first 
12 
Monday of January next after his election ... They 
shall perform such duties as are prescribed by this 
constitution and as may be prescribed by law. 
At Section 10 of Article VII, the Governor is given 
the powers of appointment of officers whose appointment 
or election is not otherwise provided for in the following 
language: 
"The Governor shall nominate, and by and with 
the consent of the Senate appoint all State and 
District Officers whose offices are established by 
this constitution, or which may be created by law, 
and whose appointment or election is not otherwise 
provided for ... " 
At Section 17 of Article VII, the Ut,ah Constitution 
describes the duties of the Treasurer jointly with a de-
scription of those of the Auditor in the following language: 
"The Auditor shall be the auditor of public 
accounts, and the Treasurer shall be the custodian 
of public monies, and each shall perform such other 
duties as may be provided by law." 
It is the contention of the plaintiff, Treasurer, that the 
above constitutional organizational structure does not im-
power the Legislature to directly make appointments of de-
puties and personnel within the Office of the State Treas-
urer nor does it grant to the Legislature the power to dele-
gate powers to appoint personnel and deputies of the Office 
of the State Treasurer to the Governor or to any other ad-
ministrative officer who is a part of the Executive Depart-
ment of the State of Utah. The power to appoint the sub-
ordinate officers and employees through whom the laws or 
duties and functions are to be performed by a Constitutional 
Officer is a necessary incident to the power to execute the 
laws. If any other Executive Department were granted the 
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power to make appointments of administrative personnel 
and employees of the office of the State Treasurer it \Vould 
for all practical purposes nulify the provisions of Article VII, 
Section 1 of the State Constitution which creates the several 
constitutional officers, including the State Treasurer, and 
makes them elective officers selected by the public. The 
power to appoint deputies and administrators in an administ-
rative office such as that of the Treasurer is for all practical 
purposes the power to administer the functions of that of-
fice. 
One of the most recent leading cases which deals with 
this problem of the separation of powers and of the effect 
of the power of appointment is the case of Tucker, Secre-
tary of State, et. al., v. State, (Indiana) 218 Ind. 614 35 N.E. 
Rep. 2nd, 270. That case involved the reorganization of the 
Executive branch of Government of the State of Indiana. 
That reorganization involved five separate statutes which 
provided for the termination of the tenure of various of-
ficers and boards, the placement of powers of appointment 
in the Governor and the realigning of the various duties and 
functions of the officers including some of their constitu-
tional officers. The Supreme Court of Indiana, among other 
questions, was required to deal with the problem of appoint 
ment of officers by the Governor to the various administ-
rative departments of government including the constitu-
tional officers. That court had this to say: 
"At the time our Constitution was adopted, it 
was settled by the great weight of authority that 
the provision granting the Executive po\ver and the 
admonition to take care that the laws are faithfully 
executed carried with them as a necessary and es-
sential incident the power to appoint to office." 
(Page 281) 
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The Indiana Court in turn quoted from Chancellor 
Kent. page 287 of Kent's Commentaries on American Law 
cl;'; follows: 
"The appointment of the subordinate officers 
of government concerned in the administration of 
law, belongs with great propriety to the President, 
who is bound to see that the laws are faithfully ex-
ecuted and who is generally charged with the power's 
and responsibility of the Executive Department. The 
association of the Senate with the President in the 
exercise of this power, is an exception to the general 
delegation of Executive authority; and if he were 
not expressly invested with the exclusive right of 
nomination in the instances before us, the organiza-
tion of this department would be very unskillful, 
and the government degenerate into a system of 
cabal favoritism and intrigue." 
Incidental to commenting upon the power of appoint-
ment and the fact that it constitutes in reality power to 
administer the office to which the appointments are made, 
the also took into consideration the power of removal 
from office a power which is also delegated by the legisla-
ture to the Executive council in Section 9 of the Money 
Management Act when the legislature provided "the in-
vestment officer and the financial analyst shall serve at 
the will of the Investment Council." 
Of this power, the Indiana court said at page 
282, "Removal of Executive Officials from office is 
an executive function; the power to remove, like 
the power to appoint is part of the Executive power." 
The Indiana Supreme Court also quoted from an ear-
lier Indiana decision, Hovey v. Noble, 21 N.E., 248 118 Ind. 
350. This was a case which involved an effort upon the part 
of the legislature to provide for appointments into the Judi-
15 
cial branch of government. The Indiana court in that case 
said, 
"The truth is, that all independent departments 
have some appointing power as an incident of the 
principle power, for without it no department can be 
independent." 
"A department without power to select those 
to whom it must entrust part of its essential duties 
cannot be independent. If it must accept as 'minist-
ers and assistants' as Lord Bacon calls them, per-
sons selected for them by another department, then, 
it is dependent upon the department which makes 
the selections. To be independent the power of the 
Judiciary must be exclusive, and exclusive it cannot 
be if the legislature may deprive it of the right to 
choose those with whom it shall share its labors or 
its confidences. If one kingdom possesses the right 
to send into another ministers and assistants, to 
share with the governing power its functions and 
duties, the latter kingdom is in no sense independ-
ent." (Page 247 of 21 N.E.) 
The concept of division of powers and a nonencroach-
ment upon the functions of one department by another ap-
plies equally to the impropriety of permitting one constitu-
tional officer in the administrative or Executive branch of 
government to encroach upon the functions and duties of 
another constitutional officer also within the Executive or 
administrative branch of government. 
The legislature could not delegate to the Treasurer any 
of the Executive powers enjoyed by the Governor. Con-
versely the Governor cannot be granted by the legislature 
the custodial powers over public money granted to the 
Treasurer. Again the Indiana court in Tucker v. State 
dealt with this matter. It recognized that each branch of 
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government and each administrative office within any 
branch had power to appoint the officers whose duties are 
in incident to the function of the appointing office. 
The court had this to say with relation to the various 
powers of appointment exercisable by the respective depart-
ments and administrative units: 
"It is equally well established by our decisions, 
and decisions elsewhere, that the general assembly 
may exercise the Executive power of appointment 
of officers and employees whose duties are an in-
cident to its legislative functions; and it cannot be 
seriously doubted that administrative officers in the 
administrative department of the government or in 
the Judicial Department may exercise the Executive 
power of appointing their own deputies and em-
ployees whose duties are incidental to the carrying 
out of the administrative functions of the offices 
they occupy. Thus, the clerk of the Supreme Court 
may appoint deputies and assistants who are to as-
sist him in his ministerial functions; and the Auditor, 
Treasurer and Secretary of State exercise like pow-
er; and if the Governor had not been broadly vested 
with the general executive power of the state but 
had been vested only with special and limited exe-
cutive authority, that would carry with it the in-
cidental executive appointing power insofar as it 
involved his subordinates and assistants . . . and 
the appointive powers of administrative and minist-
erial officers in any department must be limited to 
that which is incidental to their principle administ-
rative or ministerial functions." 
The plaintiff does not question the power of the legisl-
ature to create various kinds of offices and officers and to 
provide for their appointment by the department of Gov-
ernment granted power either by the Constitution or statute 
t'.) perform the functions thereof. It is the contention of 
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the plaintiff, however, that the legislature does not have 
power to create within the office of the State Treasurer a 
department which may perform any of the constitutional 
functions of the State Treasurer and it cannot create a 
series of administrators within the office of the State Treas. 
urer or council members who have power to perform the 
functions of the State Treasurer. Otherwise, the provisions 
of the State Constitution seeking to create an elective con-
stitutional office could readily be defeated. 
In the case at hand, the legislature by means of the 
State Money Management Act seeks to create a council 
and a director to manage the money of the State and to 
invest and reinvest it. 
In section 3 the definition of short term funds and long 
terms funds implicitly required that the investment council 
find what amount of money must be "expected to be re-
quired to be converted into cash within the next twelve 
months or less." 
Historically, the State Treasurer has performed this 
function, the State Treasurer has determined what the 
cash balance needs of the various departments whose funds 
he handles. He has determined what amounts should be 
deposited in readily available depository and what amounts 
should be invested in United States Securities upon a longer 
term basis. (Title 51, Chapter 405). That function would 
now be performed by the Investment Council. 
Constitutionally, plaintiff asserts he would be held ac-
countable if the credit standing of the State were jeopardized 
because of the inability upon the part of the various depart-
ments to pay claims and bills promptly when due. 
Section 4 of the Act creates the division of investments 
and provides that it shall be comprised of an Investment 
Council and an Investment Director and Analyst. 
18 
The Investment Council is comprised of four individuals 
who are appointed by the Governor with the advice and 
consent of the State Treasurer and the Senate. Three of 
the Council constitute a quorum. Thus, it is entirely possi-
ble that the Council can direct the investment director to 
perform money management functions which are contrary 
to the judgment and decisions of the State Treasurer. 
(Section 5, Money Management Act) 
Likewise, plaintiff asserts that the creation of the of-
fice of Investment Officer and of Financial Analyst in 
such manner that they are appointees of the State Treas-
urer but only with the approval of at least four members of 
the Investment Council and subject to termination at the 
will of the Investment Council, the legislature has effec-
tively removed from the State Treasurer the power to 
manage the affairs of the Office of the State Treasurer in 
areas related to the investment, reinvestment and manage-
ment of the public monies in his custody. 
Accordingly, plaintiff asserts that the creation of these 
offices and the method of their appointment are unconstitu-
tional. 
Asher v. Boatweight, 171 S.W.2nd, 27, Ky. 120. 
POINT 3 
THE MONEY MANAGEMENT ACT UNCONSTITUTION-
ALLY DELEGATES TO THE INVESTMENT COUNCIL 
AND TO THE INVESTMENT DIRECTOR AND INVEST-
MENT ANALYST THE CONSTITUTIONAL DlITIES AND 
POWERS OF THE STATE TREASURER TO INVEST 
AND MANAGE THE MONEY OF THE STATE. 
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The Investment Council, under the provisions of Sec-
tion 5 of the Money Management Act, is made up of four 
members appointed by the Governor (including the Com-
missioner of Financial Institutions), and only one member, 
i.e., the State Treasurer who is responsive directly to the 
State Treasurer. At Section 7, the Investment Council is 
given the functions of establishing the policies of the divi-
sion of investments, of advising, counseling and directing the 
investment officer and the financial analyst in the perform. 
ance of their duties and powers and of adopting and pro-
mulgating rules and regulations pertaining to the kind or 
nature of investment of public funds under the jurisdiction 
of the division of investments and other duties expressly 
set forth in Section 7. 
The Investment Council can make these decisions with-
out regard to the opinions or views of the State Treasurer. 
This arises out of the fact that three of the council mem-
bers shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of bus-
ness. It follows that the act of a majority will control and 
thus the State Treasurer finds himself a dissenting minority 
member. 
In defiance of the provisions of the Constitution creating 
the Office of State Treasurer, the Money Management Act 
has substituted a multiple member council to perform the 
functions of management of money which the framers of 
our Constitution had seen fit to place in the hands of a 
single person elected by the people. 
As we have previously pointed out, the determination 
of the cash balances that must remain available for use by 
the various departments, i.e., the long term and short term 
funds is now the decision of the Investment Council and the 
previous practices followed by the State Treasurer will be 
terminated by the Act. 
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Moreover, the primary obligation of the State Treas-
urer has been to safeguard the funds of the State within 
his custody. 
Subparagraph 5 of Section 7, creates guidelines relat-
ing to the depositing of public funds which are concerned 
with other factors such as "the need of local banks for loan-
able funds to support the economic growth in each area of 
the state" and in subparagrph (b) "for at least a biennial 
rotation of demand accounts of the State Treasurer among 
qualified depositories." 
A decision by majority vote of the Investment Council 
could very well place the State Treasurer in a position of 
noncompliance with his custodial duty to safeguard the 
money of the State and may create an obligation under his 
bond to protect against any loss that may occur. 
Section 9 of the Money Management Act provides that 
the chief administrative officer of the division of Invest-
ments shall be the Investment Officer and the deputy ad-
ministrative officer of the division shall be the Financial 
Analyst. Although the act provides that the appointment 
be made by the State Treasurer, it requires him to secure 
the approval "of at least four members of the Investment 
Council." In effect, the State Treasurer has lost his con-
stitutional ability to appoint a chief deputy in his office and 
so too \vith respect to the administrative assistant known 
as the Financial Analyst. 
Moreover, the salaries are to be fixed by the Council 
in consultation with the director of Finance and approval 
by the State Board of Examiners. Again, effectively, the 
State Treasurer has lost any real power to appoint these 
important administrative officers within the office of the 
State Treasurer. 
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In addition, Section 9 provides that "in the discretion of 
the Investment Council, both positions (Investment Officer 
and Financial Analyst) may be filled by one person. The 
Investment Officer and the Financial Analyst shall serve 
at the will of the Investment Council." 
In practical effect, these two administrative officers 
have no relationship to the State Treasurer. If the Invest-
ment Council desires to establish a policy which the two 
administrative officers find undesirable, their positions can 
be terminated or consolidated so as to elminiate a disident 
or to eliminate them both. 
When we take into consideration the powers granted 
them by Section 11 of the Act, we must further recognize 
that for all practical purposes the State Treasurer has lost 
all voice in connection with these important functions re-
lating to the investment and management of public funds: 
'' ( 1) To make purchases, sales, exchanges, 
investments, and reinvestments in respect to public 
funds subject to the jurisdiction of the division of 
Investments pursuant to the policies, objectives, and 
requirements of this Act. 
(2) To see that public funds invested under 
the jurisdiction of the division of Investments are at 
all times handled to the best interest of the body 
owning or having control of such funds, after giving 
consideration to the needs of such body. 
(3) To make such reports as Investment Coun-
cil may require." 
Similarly, Section 12 grants powers to the Financial 
Analyst relating to the informational data important toward 
money management and investment. The results of his 
studies are reported to the Investment Officer and the In-
vestment Council not to the State Treasurer. Moreover, he 
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is subject only to the requirements of the Investment Coun-
cil as to the making of additional reports. That section 
reads as follows: 
"The Financial Analyst shall have the following 
powers and duties: 
(1) To collect, organize and analyze cash flow 
data regarding the financial systems of the State 
and any other body owning or having control of 
public funds subject to the jurisdiction of the divi-
sion of Investments and to provide timely inform-
ation of this to the Investment Officer and the In-
vestment Council. 
(2) To develop and submit to the Investment 
Officer and the Investment Council programs for the 
timing and applications of cash within the financial 
systems of the State and any other body owning or 
having control of public funds subject to the juris-
diction of the division of Investments and to deve-
lop improvements of same. 
( 3) To make such reports as the Investment 
Council may require. 
At Section 1 7, the Act provides that the Investment 
Officer shall have the power to sell or otherwise dispose of 
securities or investments in which public funds under the 
jurisdiction of the division have been invested and have 
thereby deprived the State Treasurer of performing any 
act of judgment with reference to the management of the 
money involved. The only function left to the State Treas-
urer, an elective constitutional officer, is purely that of a 
ministerial depository. 
Plaintiff submits that this is not the constitutional 
intent and that he has been effectively deprived of his con-
stitutional duties and powers by the provisions of the Act 
complained of in his Complaint. 
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The constitutionality of legislative efforts to eliminate 
or materially reduce the functions of constitutional officers 
was denied in three relatively recent cases by the Supreme 
Courts of Idaho, New Mexico and Arizona. Each involved 
efforts to elminate or reduce the functions of the State 
Auditor or a constitutional officer in the following cases: 
Wright v. Callahan (Idaho) 99, P2nd 961: 61 
Idaho 167 
Thompson v. Leg. Audit. Comm. (N.M.) 448 
P2nd 799. 
Hudson v. Kelly (Ariz.) 263, P2nd 362; 76 
Ariz. 255. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff respectfully urges the court to declare as un-
constitutional the Sections referred to in his Complaint and 
that the defendants be permanently enjoined from effect-
uating those provisions. 
Moreover, plaintiff asserts that the unconstitutionality 
of the sections complained of so materially affect the scope 
of the Money Management Act as to render all of its pro-
visions so uncertain and meaningless as to render the Act 
impossible of administration and therefore unconstitutional. 
The Money Management Act, Chapter 206, Laws of 
Utah, 1969, (Senate Bill #205) is unconstitutional in that 
it seeks to deprive the State Treasurer of his powers and 
duties as a constitutional officer and in particular of the 
powers and duties granted to him under the provisions of 
Article VII, Section 17, Constitution of the State of Utah. 
Appellant submits that the judgment of the District 
Court is erroneous and that this Court should reverse its 
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decision. In its stead, it should find that the Money Man-
ac;emcnt Act is unconstitutional and of no effect. 
Respectfully submitted, 
A.M.FERRO 
Special Asst. Attorney General 
414 Walker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant 
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